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Abstract “Privacy as confidentiality” has been the dominant paradigm in
computer science privacy research. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs)
that guarantee confidentiality of personal data or anonymous communication
have resulted from such research. The objective of this paper is to show that
such PETs are indispensable but are short of being the privacy solutions they
sometimes claim to be given current day circumstances. Using perspectives
from surveillance studies we will argue that the computer scientists’ conception
of privacy through data or communication confidentiality is techno-centric
and displaces end-user perspectives and needs in surveillance societies. We
will further show that the perspectives from surveillance studies also demand
a critical review for their human-centric conception of information systems.
Last, we rethink the position of PETs in a surveillance society and argue for the
necessity of multiple paradigms for addressing privacy concerns in information
systems design.
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Introduction
My concern has been and will continue to be directed solely at striking
a balance between democracy and technology, between the advantages
of computerization and the potential safeguards that are inherent in it
and the right of every citizen to the protection of his right of privacy
(Gallagher 1967).
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These are the words of Representative Cornelius Gallagher who through
a series of hearings in 1966 brought the problem of computerization and
its threats to privacy to public consciousness. Interestingly, today many of
the arguments that Gallagher gave in his hearings still prevail. At the time,
Gallagher was responding to the plans of the U.S. government to introduce a
National Data Center that would collect information about every U.S. citizen.
During those hearings Gallagher articulated important challenges to the then
nascent scientific discipline of computer science. Shortly after these hearings
Gallagher was invited as a keynote speaker at the American Federation of
Information Processing Societies’ 1967 Spring Joint Computer Conference
(JCC) in New Jersey, U.S.A.1 Subsequently, his challenges were echoed in
the Communications of the ACM (Titus 1967), historically one of the most
prominent journals within the computer science community.
Given that special historical constellation, we can state that 1967 was the
year in which privacy as a research topic was introduced to the field of
computer science.2 A session on privacy problems was introduced at the con-
ference and a total of 5 papers were presented on the topic of privacy.3 Privacy
was never explicitly defined in these papers but assumed to be confidentiality
of data, the breach of privacy then meaning the leakage of data to unautho-
rized principals in military and non-military systems. Although Representative
Gallagher defined privacy as the right to freedom of action, speech, belief
or conscience and listed potential risks of information collection to these
(Gallagher 1967), the transposition of the concept to research in computer
science was driven by existing mechanisms. Privacy was hence limited to data
confidentiality and secrecy of communications.
Research on privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) that guarantee some
type of data confidentiality and hence user privacy have been an important
research topic ever since.4 The data that is kept confidential using PETs may be
stored data, communicated data, or the conditions of a given communication.
The last one guarantees the anonymity of the sender and/or receiver of the
communication and in some cases only the confidentiality of the relationship
between the sender and the receiver.5 The data is kept confidential from an
1The series of conferences commenced in 1961 and were dissolved in 1990 (Room 2007).
2Although in the papers presented at the Spring JCC the suggested privacy and security solutions
have parallels to the much longer standing tradition of research on cryptography and communica-
tions security, we in this paper start our account of privacy research in computer science with the
explicit introduction of the term “privacy” at the Spring JCC Conference.
3Three of the authors were from the RAND Corporation (Ware 1967a; Petersen and Turn
1967), one from M.I.T (Glaser 1967) and one from a company named Allen-Babcock Computing
(Babcock 1967).
4Later, other sub-fields in computer science have proposed other types of PETs that often rely on
the contractual negotiation of personal data revelation. These are sometimes called “soft privacy”
tools and a review of such PETs can be found in (Wang and Kobsa 2006). Such tools are not the
focus of this paper since they are not based on the same assumptions that PETs for preserving data
confidentiality, also known as “hard privacy”, build upon.
5In relationship anonymity, the sender and receiver of messages may be known, but not the
relationship between any pair of senders and receivers.
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adversarial which may be the communication partner, e.g., service provider,
data holder or an attacker in the environment. Such PETs are designed to
enable anonymous speech, hide communication content and guarantee the
unlinkability of electronic activities in a networked world.
In the last ten years, various authors in the emerging field of surveillance
studies have raised critiques with respect to PETs and what can be called the
privacy as confidentiality paradigm. Surveillance studies is a cross-disciplinary
initiative to understand the rapidly increasing ways in which personal details
are collected, stored, transmitted, checked, and used as a means of influencing
and managing people and populations (Lyon 2002). Surveillance is seen as one
of the defining features that define and constitute modernity. In that sense,
surveillance is seen as an ambiguous tool that may be feared for its power but
also for its potential to protect and enhance life chances. Departing from para-
noid perspectives on surveillance, the objective of these studies is to critically
understand the implications of current day surveillance on power relations,
security and social justice.
Some of the surveillance studies scholars show that, given modern day
conditions, computer scientists’ conception of privacy through data or com-
munication confidentiality has been mostly techno-centric and displaces end-
user perspectives. Orlikowski (2007) defines techno-centricity as a perspec-
tive which is mainly interested in understanding how technology leverages
human action, taking a largely functional or instrumental approach. Within
such approaches, engineers and others tend to assume unproblematically that
“technology is largely exogenous, homogenous, predictable, and stable, per-
forming as intended and designed across time and place”. This perspective
tends to put technology in the center, blend out cultural and historical
influences, and produces technologically deterministic claims.
The dichotomous opposite of techno-centricity is human-centricity, a per-
spective which focuses on how humans make sense of and interact with
technology in various circumstances. In human-centric accounts, technology
is understood to be different depending on meanings humans attribute to it
and through the different ways people interact with it. This approach takes
“cultural and historical contexts into consideration, but has a tendency to
minimize the role of technology itself” (Orlikowski 2007).
Our objective in this paper is to study how materiality—in our case sur-
veillance and privacy technology—and the social are constitutively entangled.
Meaning that PETs and privacy related social practices in spaces of ubiquitous
surveillance cannot be seen as ontologically distinct matters but constitute each
other: social practices in spaces subject to ubiquitous surveillance are consti-
tuted by existing surveillance practices, technologies and by PETs, whereas
PETs are the product of humans, their own social practices and conceptions
of how surveillance is made effective and can be countered. Through a deeper
understanding of this constitutive entanglement we can be more precise and
constructive with our critique of PETs. We can also make explicit, evaluate and
reconfigure the assumptions that designers of PETs rely upon. Our long term
objective is use the analysis of these constitutive entanglements as a point of
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departure to explore critically informed approaches to privacy research within
computer science.
In order to accomplish our objective, in Section “Privacy as data confiden-
tiality and anonymity” we give an overview of computer science research on
privacy as data confidentiality and anonymity. Here we also list some of the
assumptions common to this type of research. Next, in Section “Surveillance
society and PETs” we survey perspectives from surveillance studies for analy-
ses of current day conditions and how these escape techno-centric narrations
of PETs. Then, in Section “Revisiting PETs” we follow up the critiques of
PETs with an evaluation of both, the consequences of these critiques for
computer scientists and designers of systems, as well as the human-centricity
in the different surveillance perspectives. Last, we propose the application of
multiple privacy research paradigms that could be utilized to improve infor-
mation systems design and that make apparent the constitutive entanglement
of technologies and social practices in the context of privacy.
Hence, our main contribution with this paper is a critical interdisciplinary
review of PETs that explores their potentials and limitations in a world of
rapidly developing technology, ubiquitous surveillance, as well as changing
perceptions, legislation and practices of privacy. Similar critique of PETs have
been written in the past (Phillips 2004; Stalder 2002; Tavani and Moor 2001).
We have included the first two of these perspectives in the later sections.
In addition to reviewing existing critiques, the contributions of this paper
are valuable for the following: First, confidentiality as the way to preserve
privacy is a recurring theme in privacy debates generally and in computer
science specifically. Therefore, re-examining whether this holds given changing
social and technical conditions is important. Second, we have some additional
arguments in the section on “the information perspective” which provides
interesting challenges to privacy research in computer science. Further and
most important of all, our argument is not that anonymity and confidentiality
tools should be done away with. On the contrary, we believe that they need to
be re-positioned with respect to the effects of ubiquitous surveillance in order
to adapt the assumptions and claims of PETs to changing user requirements in
their socio-technical contexts.
Privacy as data confidentiality and anonymity
Personal data as the focus of PETs
In those initial papers on privacy presented at the 1967 Spring Joint Computer
Conference (Glaser 1967; Babcock 1967; Petersen and Turn 1967; Ware
1967a, b) the researchers had noticed the importance of sensitive data. Yet,
defining what actually counted as “private” sensitive data was difficult to
define. The authors distinguished between military and non-military systems,
with the latter meaning industrial or non-military governmental agencies. Their
objective was to devise systems that would avoid intentional or accidental
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disclosure of confidential sensitive data belonging to other users (Ware 1967a).
In defining how to classify private information, a pragmatic approach was to
ask how the military classification of document confidentiality i.e. confidential,
highly-confidential, top secret, could somehow be mapped onto sensitive
personal data. The authors also discussed, if such a mapping was unrealistic
when a central authority and the necessary discipline to enforce such schemes
were lacking in non-governmental/private computer networks (Ware 1967b).
In all the papers, confidentiality, a concept that played an important role
in military think, was chosen as the main paradigm for privacy research. The
authors were aware that military concepts could not be applied to society at
large, hence all the papers attempted to distinguish security (military) from
privacy (non-military). Yet, they had few other frameworks than military to
take as a reference.
Ever since, there has been much progress in “non-military” contexts
defining what should count as informational privacy (Gutwirth 2002; Solove
2006; Nissenbaum 2004) and which data are personal (EU Directive 95/46/EC
(EU 1995), Art. 2 (a)) and sensitive (EU Directive 95/46/EC (EU 1995),
Art. 8). Various data protection legislations have defined the category “per-
sonal data” and “sensitive data” as subject to privacy protection. An example
is the EU Directive that states: Personal data are “any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person [...]; an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to
an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” (EU Directive
95/46/EC (EU 1995), Art. 2 (a)); sensitive data include data “revealing racial or
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex-life” (EU
Directive 95/46/EC (EU 1995) Art. 8).
Important for our purposes is the emphasis these definitions put on identity.
Identity is assumed to be unique for each natural person and data traces can
be linked to these uniquely identifiable persons. This emphasis on identity is
coupled with a relative under-specification of content that counts as personal
or sensitive data. The U.S. terminology requires the protection of personally
identif iable data. In contrast, personally identifiable data refers to a data set
that is well defined. The standard types of personally identifiable data are
profile data describing individuals, including name, address, and health status.
It is probably in line with this focus on identity and identifiability that, in
comparison to the contributions at the 1967 Spring Joint Computer Confer-
ence, from the 80s onwards PETs focusing on the unlinkability of data6 gained
6Unlinkability may refer to the unlinkability of the identity of the person from the traces she leaves
behind, or the unlinkability of multiple traces, or simply of two (digital) items of interest such that
these items of interest are no more and no less related after the observation of an (attacker) than
they are related concerning (the attacker’s) a-priori knowledge (Pfitzmann and Hansen 2008).
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in popularity. Hence, in computer science identifiability includes inferring the
link between an individual and some data probabilistically.
The construct of probabilistic identification would require the expansion
of which data would count as personal or sensitive data in data protection
legislation.7 We discuss the different definitions of probabilistic identification
and its implications in more detail in the next section.
Anonymity as a privacy enhancing mechanism
Once data about a person exists in digital form on a networked system it is very
difficult to provide that person with any guarantees on the control of that
data. This lack of control has contributed to personal data leakages and
undesirable secondary use of personal data on the Internet,8 often leading
to privacy breaches. Much of the personal data collected using current day
technologies represent activities of individuals assumed to be private or shared
by a few prior to their digitization. Not digitizing these activities and avoiding
the exchange of such digitized data would avoid further parties acquiring
knowledge of these activities. But, this would substantially limit many of the
technologies we use daily and is often undesirable for reasons we will account
for in later sections.
A weaker form of preserving privacy is then to keep personal data con-
fidential from a greater public. This would require the use of cryptography and
secure systems: the prior has so far proven to be inaccessible for most Internet
users, while the latter is extremely difficult to accomplish in networked systems.
A yet another form of privacy can be achieved through what is called
anonymity. Anonymity is achieved by unlinking the identity of the person
from the traces of his/her activities in information systems. Anonymity keeps
the identity of the persons in information systems confidential but is not
primarily concerned with how public the traces consequently become. This is
also paralleled in data protection legislation which by definition cannot and
does not protect anonymous data (Guarda and Zannone 2009).
In technical terms, anonymity can be based on different models. In commu-
nications, anonymity is achieved when an individual is not identifiable within
a limited set of users, called the anonymity set (Pfitzmann and Hansen 2008).
An individual carries out a transaction anonymously, if an observer cannot
7The consequences of probabilistic identification as legal evidence has been picked up by Braman
(2006) but is beyond the scope of this paper. Similarly, in Wills and Reeves (2009) the authors
problematize some of the heuristics used to probabilistically infer information about individuals
based on the characteristics shared by their network vicinity. The authors argue that the heuristics
are comparable to notions like “birds of a feather flock together”, “judge a man by the company
he keeps”, or “guilty by association”.
8The focus of this paper is on the Internet based technologies and privacy concerns. We are aware
that breaches also occur with devices that are off-line and on networks other than the Internet.
Further, mobile technology has opened up a whole new set of questions about the feasibility of
keeping location data confidential, or what location privacy can mean. Whether our analyses in
this paper also hold for these problems is beyond the scope of this paper.
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distinguish her from others. The observer, often also called the adversary,
may obtain some additional information (Diaz 2005). This means that the
observer captures probabilistic information about the likelihood of different
subjects having carried out a given transaction. The observing party may be
the communication partner or some other party with observation capabilities
or with the ability to actively manipulate messages. Depending on the ob-
server’s capabilities different models can be constructed with varying degrees
of anonymity for the given anonymity set. Exactly what degree of anonymity
is sufficient in a given context is dependent on legal and social consequences
of a data breach and is an open question (Diaz 2005). TOR9 and JAP10 are
some popular and established examples of applications that enable anonymous
communication on the Internet. From here on, we refer to such anonymity
systems as anonymizers.
Technically the capabilities of anonymizers are limited by the size of
the anonymity set, the powers of the observer and by the content of the
communication. If the communication content includes personally identifiable
information, then the communication partners can re-identify the source
person. Worse, if the communication content is unencrypted then intermediary
observers may also re-identify persons (or institutions) as was shown by Dan
Egerstad.11 Another technical vulnerability can stem from the persistence of
communication, meaning after observing multiple rounds of communication, the
degree of anonymity may decrease and the probability of re-identification increases.
In databases that store personal data, the objectives and conditions for
establishing anonymity sets are somewhat different. The end of the 90s saw
the development of a new research field called privacy preserving data mining
(PPDM) or publishing (PPDP). The objective of PPDM is to find methods
to publish databases holding records of personal data such that certain infor-
mation can be inferred from the database, while forestalling the inference of
certain other information (information that could lead to privacy breaches).
Ideally, the so published database cannot be used to identify individuals
uniquely or in a small set of individuals.
Early results showed that simple de-identification is not enough for database
anonymization. In her seminal work Sweeney (Sweeney 2002) showed that
she could re-identify 85% of the persons in anonymized hospital reports
using the publicly available non-personal attributes i.e. gender, age and zip
code. Sweeney proposed methods to achieve k-anonymity in databases: A
database listing information about individuals offer k-anonymity protection, if
the information contained for each person cannot be distinguished from k − 1
individuals whose information also appears in the database. Later work in the
field proved that k-anonymity alone, or any improvements of the same idea as
9http://www.torproject.org/
10http://anon.inf.tu-dresden.de/index_en.html
11In 2007 Dan Egerstad set up a number of TOR exit nodes (a popular anonymizer http://www.
torproject.org) and sniffed over 100 passwords from traffic flowing through his nodes. The list
included embassies and government institutions (Paul 2007).
546 S. Gürses
provided in (Kifer and Gehrke 2006; Li and Li 2007; Rebollo-Monedero et al.
2008; Domingo-Ferrer and Torra 2008), cannot provide absolute guarantees
against re-identification (Dwork 2006).
The results of the two branches of research on anonymous communication
and database anonymization point to research challenges and limitations.
PPDM research results show that the scope of personal data cannot be re-
stricted to a limited set of data e.g., name, birthday, address and that the scope
of what counts as personal data may be difficult to determine. The results from
traffic analysis and anonymous communications show that the information that
can be inferred by analyzing the conditions of communication, even if the
content of the communication is hidden, may lead to undesirable revelation
of personal data. If anonymizers are used to hide who is communicating with
whom, however, without encryption at some point in the communication path,
an analysis of the unencrypted content may lead to the identification of the
anonymous communication partners. Anonymous and encrypted communica-
tion addresses all these problems, although it may also be vulnerable to re-
identification if the communication is persistent.
These are known technical limitations which may be addressed through the
development of improved methods that better mitigate the vulnerabilities.
However, these results also demand that the scope of personal data be
expanded and the privacy as confidentiality paradigm be re-evaluated. They
invoke additional research questions about the usability and practicability of
PETs and PPDM methods in a world of multiple data sources, unlimited
aggregation and possible inferences. We will come back to some of these issues
later. For now, let us look at some of the assumptions that underlie PETs.
Anonymity and confidentiality in the internet: assumptions of PETs
There are some basic assumptions of the privacy as confidentiality paradigm
that inform the logic of PETs. These assumptions are often not made explicit in
research papers on privacy technologies but are articulated between the lines.
The assumptions vary between technical and socio-technical ones and can be
listed as follows:
1. There is no trust on the Internet Here, the absence of trust refers to a number
of things. First, given its current architecture, the users of the Internet
can never be sure if a communication has been established with the
correct party, i.e., as the popular analogy states, whether the partner they
are communicating with is a dog, and if this dog/non-dog is receiving the
sent messages; and if the message is received. Further, the users cannot
determine whether those messages remain unchanged. Next, given an
unprotected communication channel and unencrypted messages, there are
no guarantees against third parties eavesdropping on that communication.
Last, once the communication has been established and message or data
transfer has taken place, there are no guarantees that the transmitted data
will not be distributed to further parties.
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2. Users are individually responsible for minimizing the collection and dissem-
ination of their personal data By suggesting that through the use of PETs
privacy can be enhanced or protected, an implicit claim is that personal
data on the Internet originates from the users themselves. If the users want
to protect their privacy then they should protect their data individually.
This is especially the case because, see assumption (1) there is no trust on
the Internet.
3. If they know your data, then they know you Although this is not necessarily
limited to computer science papers, when discussing privacy and the effects
of data collection knowing data about individuals gets mixed up with
knowing those individuals. Knowing a user or individual here refers to
knowing some or all of the following: intentions, causalities, and reached
objectives.12
4. Collection and processing of personal data, if used against individuals,
will have a chilling ef fect The personally identifiable data distributed on
the Internet may be used against individuals in unwanted and unclaimed
ways. Especially if we make the assumption (3) if they know your data,
they know you, then it follows that massive collection of data may have
severe consequences. Misuse of personal data in repressive, discriminating,
or simply undesirable ways may have a chilling effect. Hence keeping
personal data confidential is a secure way to avoid such chilling effects.
5. Technical solutions should be used to protect privacy instead of relying
solely on legal measures Data may leak legally or illegally since it is difficult
to control data and (1) there is no trust on the Internet. In order to avoid
such leakage of data, technical solutions like anonymity and confidentiality
should be preferred over legal protection.
These assumptions, although coherent and strong in their arguments, can be
criticized for being techno-centric. In order to show why, we will first look at
some of the findings of surveillance studies with respect to life in a surveillance
society. When appropriate, we will list critiques of PETs based on the privacy
as confidentiality paradigm, as they are articulated in the different surveillance
studies perspectives. In Section “Revisiting PETs” we will return to these
assumptions.
Surveillance society and PETs
In the following, we give a short overview of some of the voices that we identify
as surveillance studies perspectives that position themselves with respect to the
12There are numerous court cases in which digital data are used as evidence in ways which claim
much more than the data seems at face value to represent. For example, a court in the U.S.
accepted pictures from a social network site of a young woman enjoying a party a number of
weeks after a car accident with casualties. The picture was used as proof that she lacked remorse
(Wagstaff 2007).
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privacy as confidentiality paradigm or PETs. Each of the perspectives investi-
gates surveillance spaces and their affects in our lives and on our understanding
of privacy. We sum up the different perspectives in the daily, marketing,
political, performative and information perspectives. We will shortly account
for each of these perspectives and their critique of PETs.
The daily perspective on surveillance
A typical critique of Internet users is that they do not care for their privacy.
Even though different types of PETs are available to them, and in different
studies users express their concerns for the privacy of their data, when they do
make use of systems, these concerns evaporate and PETs are rarely utilized
(Berendt et al. 2005). This low adoption of PETs has been contributed to the
usability problems that are associated with PETs. Studies like “Why Johnny
can’t encrypt?” have argued exactly for this point (Whitten and Tygar 1999).
In other cases, the users have been accused of being insensitive to the abuse
of their data, naive, or simply ignorant of the risks that they are taking (Gross
and Acquisti 2005) allowing the surveillance of every aspect of their daily lives.
In comparison, surveillance studies conceptualize individuals as being over-
burdened with the duty of protecting their individual privacy against powerful
(governmental) institutions. In describing why individual protection of privacy
is an unlikely solution to the surveillance problem, Felix Stalder underlines
the consequences of the fact that our societies are increasingly organized as
networks underpinned by digital information and communication technologies
(Stalder 2002). He argues:
In a network, however, the characteristics of each node are determined
primarily by its connections, rather than its intrinsic properties, Hence
isolation is an undesirable option.
As an example of the networked society, Stalder talks about how when
going to the social services, we have to show information about housing and
work, while at work we have to give bank information, which provides us with
a credit card, which is a precondition to renting a car, etc. Therefore, it is the
connectedness that provides individuals with access to various systems rather
than their relationship one-by-one with these institutions.
Therewith, Stalder problematizes PETs that make use of anonymity or even
unlinkable pseudonyms13 for daily encounters. Wide spread use of anonymity
and unlinkable pseudonymity tools burdens the individuals, more so then
offering them tools of protection. Instead, Stalder argues that the burden
13Unlinkable pseudonyms refer to systems in which users identify themselves with different
pseudonyms for different sets of transactions. For an observer it should not be possible to identify
if two pseudonyms are coming from the same user. If implemented in an infrastructure with a
trusted third party distributing the pseudonyms, then these can be revoked, ideally only under
certain (legally defined) conditions.
PETs and their users: a critical review of the privacy as confidentiality paradigm 549
to protect their privacy should be taken off the individual’s shoulders and
accountability should be asked of database holders.
The marketing perspective on surveillance
One of the main concerns with the collection of personal data is that of
categorization and consequent social sorting practices. A typical example of
discriminatory categorization is the use of geodemographic systems, which
have been critiqued in previous studies (Curry and Phillips 2003; Graham
2005). Therewith, marketers and companies can decide on desirable and non-
desirable customers, excluding parts of the population. The latter are no
exceptions to existing economic models and are called dead weight loss (Bauer
et al. 2006).
Anonymity offers little protection against these systems. The classification
of individuals with respect to marketing categories (or for that matter gov-
ernmental surveillance categories for crime suspects) is not necessarily based
on the unique identity of persons but rather on attributes that they carry. In
that sense, these systems continue to work even if the individuals using the
systems are anonymized. What is important for these systems are behavioral
data (patterns of user activities over time) and user attributes. A newcomer to
the system does not have to be identified uniquely, it is enough if their behavior
can be matched, given a set of categories.
Exactly this critique is picked up and taken a step further by Zwick and
Dholakia, marketing specialists critical of existing geodemographic systems
and consumer databases (Zwick and Dholakia 2003). Zwick states that the
control of the consumer to determine his digital identity is minimal. Because,
Zwick claims:
Implicit in the conceptualization of all of these tactics is the assumption
that the consumer self is ontologically distinct from its representation in
the electronic market-space. Yet, from a poststructuralist perspective, the
subject cannot be conceived in this way. Because the consumer is con-
stituted by language and the language governing the electronic market
space is constituted by databases. The consumer (as a meaningful cultural
representation, not as a body) does not exist outside this constitutive field
of discursive power. Hence, the consumers digital identity is his or her
real identity because marketing is targeted toward the consumer profile
rather than the real person.
The authors argue that knowledge is a function of linguistic power and
linguistic power in the mode of information resides with database technologies.
Hence, very much like Stalder the authors propose that a struggle for consumer
identity needs to be fought at the level of the database.
The authors’ critique of PETs is severe. They claim that PETs offer “cus-
tomers” only a false perception of autonomy. The consumer categories cannot
be manipulated. Indeed, as an alternative the authors argue that consumers
must be given direct access to customer databases in order to ensure that he
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or she regains a viable voice in the act of his or her constitution as a customer.
The customer has to be enabled in (co)-authoring their own identity.
The political perspective on surveillance
Within the privacy as confidentiality approach, there is an assumption that the
protection of those issues, activities, opinions deemed to be private and the
private sphere is ultimately a good thing. Phillips (2004) produces a critique of
this normative approach based on feminist and queer theory. He says that:
Some feminist scholars have argued that it is this creation of a private,
domestic sphere apart from the public realm, that is the privacy problem.
Certain populations and issues are relegated to this private sphere, partic-
ularly women and issues of sexuality. The public/private distinction then
serves as a tool of social silencing and repression. From this perspective,
the most important privacy issues are not those of freedom from intrusion
into the domestic realm, but instead of the social construction of the
public/private divide itself.
If we take a look at newspaper headlines in mainstream media on possible
privacy breaches in the context of new technologies then Phillips’ pointer
becomes even more interesting. More often than not, these articles are about:
drinking and drug habits or sexual preferences being visible to future employ-
ers(social networks), bodies becoming visible publicly (the airport scanners),
severe illnesses or dissident opinions becoming available to public, etc. In
all these horror stories of lives destroyed through the revelation of personal
information, it is also possible to find traces of backlashes against political
struggles of the last decades, e.g., politics of sexuality, labor rights, anti-
discrimination struggles. We are not arguing that all these matters should
be public and considering them private is always a matter of repression, but
rather that the debates on privacy and the development of technologies that
collect and process personal data are not devoid of the political and societal
interests of dominant groups to emphasize certain concerns while silencing
others. Further, privacy is not uniformly available and uniformly valued. The
need for privacy can change depending on the context, as in the case of abuse
or violence in the private sphere. For those who have little public power, the
apparent invasion of privacy can sometimes seem welcome (McGrath 2004).14
14There are cases, where this is exactly turned around as in the case of Federal Record Keeping
and Labeling Requirements which require secondary producers to be responsible for the record
keeping procedures primary producers gather when they produce sexually explicit material (DoU
2008). The lack of public power of those who produce sexually explicit images leads to both an
intrusion of the effected person’s privacy and to silencing of those who want to publish explicit
material. So, the argument is not that the private is always repressive and the public intervention is
always a positive one, but that both the private and public needs to be negotiable and questionable,
especially when the lives or livelihoods of those with meager public power are disputed.
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Phillips’ critique shows that through new technologies and their ability to
make things visible and invisible we are forced to re-consider what should
remain public and private. In expectation of such reconsiderations, in the EU,
the notion and protection of privacy has since long included a social dimension,
i.e., a freedom from undue interference in the development of one’s social
identity. But it still remains open, who decides when and how the bound-
aries are settled between the public and private when building information
systems.
Ideally, such privacy related design decisions need to be taken through a
social and democratic process and not determined solely by (technical, busi-
ness and legal) experts. Even then, the power relations between the different
participating and non-participating stakeholders have to be considered.
Last, Phillips suggests that instead of inscribing into systems absolute values
of what should remain private or public, systems that allow users to negotiate
when and if they want to keep their information private and public should be
considered. From the political perspective, it is therefore advisable to build
technologies that enable individuals or communities to safely and strategically
push the boundaries between the public and the private.
The performative perspective on surveillance
The importance of performativity in surveillance space becomes easily evi-
dent in the interventions of many artists whose works have often inspired
surveillance studies authors. Stephen Mann, in his series of performances “My
Manager” wears a visible camera in stores and restaurants where customers are
not permitted to take photographs, yet where CCTV surveillance is practiced.
When approached by security staff, Mann tells them that “my manager” insists
he wears the camera to ensure that he is not wasting his time during his errands.
This is not photography, he explains, since the signals are being beamed off-
site where they will be turned into images (McGrath 2004). Mann blames
everything on “My Manager” and watches to see how the power relationships
shift, how not taking responsibility for surveillance becomes ridiculous, and
managers do all of a sudden appear to question his intervention.
McGrath in his book “Loving Big Brother” very much appreciates the
wit and passion of such daily performative interventions. His analysis of
surveillance space avoids a value judgment about the morality or desirability
of surveillance technology per se. As a strategy, McGrath demands a shift
form anti-surveillance to counter-surveillance. He points to the impossibility of
controlling surveillance space itself i.e. once surveillance space exists, it can be
used by unexpected parties in unexpected ways. In that, he accepts that there
can be no trust on the Internet but derives different conclusions. Although
performances like Mann’s, or the use of cameras at demonstrations against
police brutality (Lewis 2009), or even the coincidental recording of the police
brutality practiced against Rodney King in the U.S.A. (BBC 2002) are valuable
examples of reversing the gaze, McGrath focuses on counter-surveillance that
goes beyond the reversal strategy. Instead, he proposes counter-surveillance
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that opens a space for all sorts of reversals in relation to how the gaze and its
imagery may be experienced.
McGrath argues that proliferation of surveillance will produce discontinu-
ities in experience of surveillance and produce excess. The more the surveil-
lance proliferates, and the more surveillances start competing, McGrath argues
the more we will see a battle over meaning. If we accept that surveillance space
is in suspense, that the way we will take up surveillance, the way we will be
affected, and the way we will respond are in suspense, then radical possibilities
for counter-surveillance pop-up. And, he argues that the focus of these
counter-surveillance strategies should be on deconstructing and subverting the
tyranny of meaning given to surveillance material.
But, how? Mcgrath picks up on the theories of the poststructuralist Mark
Poster, who states that: “we are already surrounded by our data bodies in sur-
veillance space.” He gives examples of artists’ works and everyday surveillance
uses that highlight the discontinuities of the surveillance narrative. It follows
from the examples that these data bodies are neither simple representations of
ourselves, nor straight falsifications, but hybrid versions of ourselves suscepti-
ble to our interventions. McGrath is aware that this multiplicity of selves will be
distorted and exploited by the consumer-corporate system. But, he concludes,
that the real danger lies in disengaging with the surveillance space.
[T]he emergence of surveillance culture is nothing less than a challenge to
our consciousness. [...] we ignore the circulating, multiple, hybrid versions
of ourselves at our peril. If we deny their relation to us in an attempt to
maintain the integrity of a unified self—rooted in rights of privacy—we
risk surrendering any control, any agency, in relation to our lives and
society.
According to these arguments, recent forms of practiced surveillance like
reality shows e.g., Big Brother, and even most articulations of web based social
networks can be seen as a realization of the fact that we live in a surveillance
saturated society. By participating in these programs and environments we
are discovering and exploring what to do about it. In that sense, McGrath
questions any assumptions on surveillance data being representative for what
people are, feel, intend, or achieve, etc. Instead, he encourages members of our
societies to enter surveillance space, to experience its affects and to challenge
any narratives that are limited to those of control and authority, or that try to
monopolize what data means and how it can be used.
The information perspective on surveillance
In most surveillance systems data receive meaning because of their relational-
ity. A single piece of data about a single person says very little unless there is a
set of data to compare it to, a framework to give it some meaning. In the age of
statistical systems, the collection of data sets is what makes it possible to make
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inferences on populations, to evolve categorizations of these populations and
to practice social sorting. This is also what Phillips describes as surveillance:
Surveillance is the creation and managing of social knowledge about
population groups. This kind of privacy can easily be violated if individual
observations are collated and used for statistical classification, which
applied to individuals makes statements about their (non)-compliance
with norms, their belonging to groups with given properties and valua-
tions, etc.
In that sense any data, by its potential to be aggregated, has many data
subjects, or better said always carries the potential of pointing to a data popula-
tion. Individual decision making on personal data always effects all correlated
subjects (Rouvroy 2009). Individualized concealment of data or unlinking of
identities from traces provides little or no protection against breaches based
on statistical inferences or discriminatory categorization for all correlated data
subjects. Any individual can be categorized, as long as enough information has
been revealed by others and aggregated in databases. The other way around, it
is impossible to guarantee semantic security in statistical databases. Meaning it
cannot be guaranteed that access to a statistical database would not enable one
to learn anything about an individual that could not be learned without access
(Dwork 2006). Hence, not only is the categorization of individuals based on
attributes a problem, but also the analysis of statistical databases may reveal
additional information about individuals. Similarly, recent studies have shown
that attributes revealed by a user’s friends or group affiliations may be used to
infer the user’s hidden attributes (Zheleva and Getoor 2009).15
Further, much information is revealed about individuals by virtue of their
associations with others. By now, we all carry digital devices that accumulate
data about our environments, as well as providing information about us to
those environments. We disseminate this information on the social web or
simply among our ecology of devices. We talk loudly on our cell phones about
ourselves and others, reveal pictures of family, friends or visited locations,
archive years worth of emails on multiple backup devices from hundreds of
persons, map out our social networks which reveals information about all those
in the network. In each of these cases it is evident that it is not only individuals
that reveal information about themselves, but we all participate in multiple
kinds of horizontal and vertical information broadcasts and surveillances. We
collectively produce data: we produce collaborative documents on wikis, take
part in online discussions and mailing lists, comment each others pictures etc.
All of this data is relational and makes sense in its collectivity. It also works the
other way, in the networked world that Stalder describes, much information is
collected about us and is linked in order to give us access to systems.
15As we mentioned earlier, such inferences are problematic because a) they are likely to gain in
popularity without a deeper understanding of what such mathematical inferences mean b) they
are based on normative assumptions with respect to “like people network with each other” which
can be oppressive or overly-judgmental as discussed in Wills and Reeves (2009).
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Hence, looking at data as snippets of individual contributions to digital
systems actually misses the actual value of that data in its collectivity and
relationality. It does not recognize the publics we create and share, one of the
greatest promises of the Internet. Individualizing participation in a surveillance
society makes it difficult to develop collective counter-surveillance strategies,
and limits our engagements with surveillance systems to individual protections
of our actions.
The depiction of information privacy and data protection analogous to
individual property rights actually exacerbates the problem of a contested
public sphere. Although the rise of the social web can be celebrated as a long
expected gift or cooking pot economy, not only its privatization through large
companies, but also the privacy debates contribute to articulations against
seeing information on the web as a public good.16 The logic of privacy and
private ownership has created the false perception that data in its singularity
is of outmost value and is controllable. Privacy through confidentiality and
anonymity can follow this logic and can be detrimental to collective critical
engagement in surveillance systems.
Revisiting PETs
Personal data is an undefined category that is widening ever since PPDM
has introduced the concept of quasi identifiers. This means that practically all
data are always potentially linkable to an individual and hence are personal
data. If we apply that directly to the logic of privacy as confidentiality, any
data may reveal something about the individual, and hence needs to be kept
confidential.17 In the different surveillance perspectives, the authors discuss
how the burden of keeping their personal data is inconvenient, undesirable,
and often impossible.
We first return to the assumptions of PETs using the critiques in the
different surveillance studies perspectives and provide an analysis for when
these assumptions tend to be techno-centric. Then, we consider the human-
centric assumptions underlying the surveillance studies perspectives, and, if
relevant, argue when PETs based on the privacy as confidentiality paradigm
may nevertheless be desirable, and even indispensable.
16It is therefore no surprise that in the latest uproar against the new Terms of Use of Facebook
users have argued for a radical deletion of their profile to include the deletion of all their
contributions to other profiles and all their correspondences to other people. The protection
of individual privacy in such instances is valued over the integrity of the discussions forums,
mailboxes of friends, posted photographs etc.
17Legally, this would mean that all data that can be related to persons will fall under the data
protection regime. The usefulness of the category “personal data” when its scope is so widened
is a worthy topic of investigation both legally, as discussed in Ohm (2009), and technically, as
discussed in Shmatikov and Narayanan (2010).
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Returning to the assumptions of PETs
1. There is no trust on the Internet This is a technical fact. Especially the
underlying design of the Internet makes it very difficult to give guarantees
on the security of communication. However, the absence of technical
measures to make certain guarantees gets conflated with social definitions
of trust. Exactly what social definitions of trust may be and how these
categories get conflated is beyond the scope of this paper. However, this
assumption should not stand alone as the only articulation of what trust is
on the Internet.
2. Users are individually responsible for minimizing the collection and dissem-
ination of their personal data As we argued in the information perspec-
tive to surveillance, the protection offered through the confidentiality of
personal data, even if personal data were a controllable category of infor-
mation, is limited. Anonymously collected data does not protect against
surveillance systems and the reflexes of their controllers to manage and
sort populations. Categories created through the databases using de-
identified data can easily be used to classify individuals by virtue of
mapping some of their attributes and their behavioral data to categorical
descriptions. The affectivity of these categories depends on the power of
those holding this data and their success in making constitutive claims.
Therefore, assuming that keeping personally identifiable data confidential
or unlinking individuals identities from their data traces may protect
individuals from social sorting and marketing systems does not hold. This
will remain the case, as long as the power of those data controllers are
not questioned. Moreover, individuals are often not the only source of
data and may not be able to control the revelation of data about them by
others.
3. If they know your data, then they know you Surveillance data is often a
place holder. It points to something that has happened or that has been,
it often looses a sense of sender and receiver. Data looses the intentions
behind its creation and starts to float in digital systems as data bodies.
Stating that knowing data is equivalent to “knowing a person” reinforces
the power of such data to stand for some “reality” or “truth”. Rather,
it is necessary to scrutinize the uses of data and deconstruct attempts to
monopolize its meaning. When accountability is of concern, e.g., medical
data, financial data, other technical mechanisms should be put into place
that guarantee the necessary proofs that a certain data validly stands for
something. In any case, to claim truth to surveillance data in order to
argue for data confidentiality as privacy protection should be practiced
sparingly.
4. Collection and processing of personal data, if used against individuals, will
have a chilling ef fect It is true that collection and processing of data, if
used against individuals can have a chilling effect. McGrath shows in most
of his examples that there could also be other effects. By now, there are
multiple occurrences in which people have publicized data in order to
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protect themselves against the breach of their privacy.18 In ubiquitously
surveilled spaces, confidentiality and anonymity can actually make some-
body suspect or devoid of protection.19 These examples point out that in a
surveillance society information may have both a chilling effect as well as
an empowering effect.
5. Technical solutions should be used to protect privacy instead of relying
solely on legal measures Given the amount of surveillance measures that
have been installed and the amount of information collected about each
person by their friends and organizations they are affiliated with, it is
unrealistic to expect that technical measures can be applied realistically
to actually keep many of our daily interactions confidential. Hence, we
must search for a combination of all three, technological solutions, legal
protections and social practices to respect those activities that we would
like protected. A solely techno-centric approach is unrealistic, is bound
to overwhelm any individual, and often too quick to dismiss many social
contracts that we enjoy in everyday life.
Re-positioning the use of PETs:
Although we have shown that many of the assumptions underlying PETs are
problematic, we still see an important value in the opportunities they have
at offer. Especially given their vulnerable position as a result of politics of
hyper-security—based on another assumption, that only criminals and people
who have something to hide use PETs—it is necessary to be precise with our
critique.
The human-centricity in the surveillance perspectives sketched above lies in
the fact that they tend to dismiss the ability of PETs to enable any alternative
digital behavior and to produce multiple (unexpected) affects. The solutions
suggested by the different perspectives also often delegate the problems to the
social: in the form of accountability, performativity and liability. We would
like to explore the potential constitutive role that PETs play or can play in a
surveillance society. Hence, we revisit PETs from each of the surveillance per-
spectives that we have summarized above in order to explore their limitations
as well as their potentials.
We agree that putting the responsibility of re-establishing privacy should not
solely lie on individuals. Further, it is paradoxical to suggest that the solution to
18Anne Roth started a blog (http://annalist.noblogs.org) in which she documented the everyday
activities of her family after her partner, Andrej Holm, was arrested in Germany in 2007 under
the accusation that he had engaged in a terrorist association. After the arrest, the family found
out that their family had been subject to police surveillance for over a year. Similarly, New
Jersey artist Hasan Elahi started documenting every minute of his life on the Internet after the
FBI mistakenly detained him at an airport (http://trackingtransience.net/). Both of these persons
made the assumption that keeping their lives public and visible protects their freedoms when
government authorities choose to threaten these freedoms.
19If using PETs makes someone suspect, then it may be necessary to think of PETs of higher orders
i.e., PETs that are used to keep the users of PETs anonymous.
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potential undesirable instances of control should lie in users having to control
their actions and data all the time. Therefore, visions of large scale anonymous
or pseudonymous systems where users constantly hide their attributes and
connections (Chaum 1985) and have to re-establish other forms of relatedness
through digital reputation (Dingledine et al. 2002) are inconvenient and
undesirable in a networked world.
Nevertheless, disabling the users’ options to exercise some control over
revealing their personal data if they want to is just as undesirable. We would
hence argue that the accountability that Stalder demands of data processing
systems should include making it mandatory for service providers to grant
anonymous and/or pseudonymous access to their services and to practice data
minimality for basic services. The networked society should continue to offer
access to those who do not want to be so engrained in the existing networks i.e.,
not being very well networked should not lead to individuals being excluded
from services. Therefore, PETs that enhance privacy through anonymity and
confidentiality—or where better suitable unlinkable pseudonyms—should be
integrated where possible. Nevertheless, their mere existence should not be
enough to relieve data controllers and processors of their responsibilities and
accountabilities. This should also have a legal effect: we should consider, if
and how anonymized data can also be legally protected without requiring
identifiability as a condition for protection.
We very much agree with the critique of Zwick and Dholakia with re-
spect to the constitutive force of these marketing databases. PETs, and more
specifically anonymizers, as long as they do not hide users’ behavioral data,
do not protect against the categorization discriminations based on marketing
databases. Further, if we accept that categories of desirable and undesirable
customers are constituted by the owners of those databases, then even hiding
behavioral data may not protect against such constitutive forces. Hence,
suggesting PETs can protect the privacy of individuals against aggressive
marketing databases goes beyond burdening individuals, but actually produces
a false perception of autonomy, and maybe even an illusion of control: if my
data is important to me, then I can protect it, if I want to give away my data for
a utility, I can do so. Such utility arguments are not viable in existing databases,
given the categorization powers exercised by their owners.
Further, Zwicks and Dholakia’s proposal for customer agency is limited to
the engagement of the “customer” with the database. Their suggestions are
to allow individuals to correct their profiles, which may go as far as deleting
oneself from the marketing databases. But in a networked world, as Stalder
argues, deletion will often not be an option. This is coupled with the technical
unfeasibility of guaranteeing that any traces of data are deleted. In that sense,
although their critique of PETs is substantial, by resurrecting a notion of
“autonomy” based on access and control of individual database entries, the
authors re-install a false sense of autonomy.
Instead, agency with respect to databases may be found in making visible
the established relationality of data. Phillips states that the only thing that
remains private in current surveillance systems are the methods through which
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these discriminatory classifications are created and used. By that he refers
to the databases and algorithms used for data mining in those databases. It
is through engagement with surveillance methods that it is possible to actually
determine possible unwanted discriminations as well as desirable effects. It
is also then possible to understand what becomes known to a specific public
e.g. government, marketers, through the aggregation of individual revelations
of information. Such transparency practices could also demystify the effects
of data collection and processing. Ideally, we can then actually collectively as
societies or communities discuss if and how desirable the newly created private
or public spaces are.
Significant is also the role PETs can play in the negotiation of the public and
private. Tools such as anonymizers and anonymized data publishing methods
may allow users to challenge boundaries between the private and public.
Anonymous speech has always been an important tool in democracies and an
extremely helpful tool against repressive regimes and legislation. Nevertheless,
the ultimate goal is not to limit the articulation of such opinions to anonymized
spaces, but to make it possible to state such opinions in public, and to safely
hold public discourse on issues that are repressed. In that sense, PETs are not
normative tools for how we should ultimately communicate if we want to have
privacy, but can play an indispensable role in negotiating the public and private
divide.
For McGrath rather than re-establishing privacy and public assembly ab-
solutes within a relativistic culture, engagement with surveillance is key.
Instead, he suggests that: ownership of imagery and data selves; freedom of
image and data circulation; the multiplicity and discontinuities of data expe-
rience; and, the emotional instability of security systems should be the center
of our focus. Prima facie, it is possible to conclude that PETs solely enable
the development of anti-surveillance strategies, and hence offer limited points
of intervention in a surveillance society. But, given their recent popularity to
circumvent repressive governments i.e. as a way to reach Internet sites that
have been blocked by governments, there may be more value in those tools
than visible at first sight. Even the mere existence of PETs may actually force
governments, law enforcement and marketers to spell out their discomfort
with anonymized data. It may force those parties to be transparent about their
desire for total surveillance.
Discussion
We have argued in the last section that despite the problems with the assump-
tions underlying PETs, and despite the legitimate critiques articulated in the
surveillance perspectives, PETs can and should be part of privacy research.
The more we engage in surveillance space, the more we will find diverse uses
for PETs. But, it was also one of our objectives in writing this paper to give
legitimacy to multiple approaches to “privacy design” in computer science. We
are especially interested in investigating approaches that do not work solely
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with the privacy as confidentiality paradigm and are able to integrate techno-
centric and human-centric perspectives as constitutive others. We believe
that a broader vision of privacy and a deeper understanding of surveillance
could help both users and computer scientists to develop systems that support
multiple kinds of privacies and data protection practices. For all of this, it is
clear that an interdisciplinary approach is imminent.
In the past years, other approaches to privacy in computer science have
started flourishing. Two of these can be shortly listed as follows:
– privacy as control A wider notion of privacy, appearing in many legal
codifications, defines the term not only as a matter of concealment of
personal information, but also as the ability to control what happens with
it. This idea is expressed in Westin’s (1970) definition of (data) privacy: the
right of the individual to decide what information about himself should be
communicated to others and under what circumstances and in the term
“informational self-determination” first used in a German constitutional
ruling relating to personal information collected during the 1983 census
(Bundesverfassungsgericht 1983). Some examples of research in this area
are accounted for under the title of identity management systems and trust
based systems with (sticky) privacy policies.
The technical mechanisms developed for the privacy as control paradigm
rely on and make use of data protection legislation. This approach is hence
valuable for improving the accountability of organizations collecting and
processing surveillance data, a point emphasized in the different surveil-
lance studies perspectives. Specifically, accountability of data controllers
and processors are increased through individual oversight of information
practices, as well as through the oversight capabilities it provides to
regulatory and/or independent bodies like data protection authorities.
Technologies and mechanisms under the privacy as control paradigm are
based on the building stones offered by the techniques developed in the
privacy as confidentiality paradigm, e.g., anonymity and unlinkability of
different identities, but are not limited to it.
– privacy as practice Most existing privacy mechanisms are preemptive.
Few mechanisms provide users with the ability to engage with data that
is revealed or is no longer under the control of that individual user.
It can help users and user populations immensely to know what data
exists about them, to understand how it travels and how it is used, and
to comprehend ways of improving privacy practices in the future. The
users can then either make requests for amendments to existing data
about themselves, which is the idea of informational self-determination,
or reconfigure their settings and change their interactions to strategically
reveal or conceal data in the future. There is little but valuable research
done on systems that support users strategic revelation and concealment
based on what is already known. Palen and Dourish argue that “privacy
management in everyday life involves combinations of social and technical
arrangements that reflect, reproduce and engender social expectations,
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guide the interpretability of action, and evolve as both technologies and
social practices change” (Palen and Dourish 2003). Following the same
lines of thought, (Lederer et al. 2004) suggest improving privacy sensitivity
in systems through feedback that improves users’ understanding of the
privacy implications of their system use. They add that this can then
be coupled with control mechanisms that allow users to conduct socially
meaningful actions through them. On a similar line of thought, Liu et al.
(2006) suggest the use of mechanisms like the identity Mirror and Nguyen
(2002) the use of privacy mirrors. Hansen (2008) suggests combining such
features with identity management mechanisms that implement privacy as
control.
We see the way forward in combining all three paradigms: privacy as
confidentiality, control and practice. The development and deployment of
these systems should ideally be accompanied with studies investigating their
social reception, use, and even rejection. We believe that a broader vision
of privacy, a deeper understanding of surveillance, a sharp understanding of
systems security, and user involvement in defining system priorities, can help
both users and computer scientists to develop systems that support multiple
kinds of privacies and data protection practices.
Last but not least, there is a need to consider other categories of data then
just personal data. We have explained in Section “The information perspective
on surveillance” the importance of the relationality of information. If we
accept that data are relational, then we have to reconsider what it means to
think within the framework of data protection that only protects “personal”
information. For legal frameworks this can be the challenge of dealing with
data sets that are co-created by many, that have multiple data subjects, or
that are controlled by many. In domains where profiling and surveillance are
common practice, addressing relational information includes the evaluation
of the appropriateness of applying Article 15 of the EC Data Protection
legislation which grants “individuals the right not to be subject to a decision ...
which is based solely on automated processing”. For computer scientists, it
requires thinking of collaborative tools, anywhere from new forms of access
control to methods for negotiating the visibility, availability and integrity of
data owned and shared by many.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown some of the problems that arise with the privacy
as confidentiality paradigm in a surveillance society. We have accomplished
this by first studying how PETs based on data confidentiality and anonymity
function and making explicit the techno-centric assumptions they rely on. We
then used surveillance studies perspectives to show how these assumptions can
be shaken by our current day conditions. We last returned to the surveillance
studies perspectives to step out of some of their human-centric assumptions. In
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doing that we explored the potentials and limitations of PETs in a surveillance
society.
Finally, we sketched two other paradigms that can be used to address infor-
mational privacy concerns within computer science. We also pointed out the
importance of understanding the relationality of data in statistical systems and
our networked world. In doing so, we argued that conceptions of surveillance
and privacy technologies are constitutively entangled and that these can be
integrated in developing privacy designs. A third element that is constitutively
entangled with both technology and surveillance but that was not the focus
of this paper are legal codings and theories. We touched on such legislation,
theories and visions when they were relevant to our discussion. We believe it
is through the combination of all three paradigms: privacy as confidentiality,
privacy as control and privacy as practice, that we can both: recognize users
abilities, wit and frustrations in navigating in surveillance space; and, develop
critical and creative designs with respect to privacy.
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